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Abstract 
In recent years, non-state actors in the Middle East have engaged a new generation of activists 
through a variety of media strategies. Notable amongst these have been a series of videogame 
interventions, which have appropriated Western game products to convey specific political and 
religious messages through the inversion or complication of the roles of hero and enemy. This 
article explores a selection of such media, produced by or in support of two prominent non-state 
groups, Hezbollah and Islamic State (IS). 
The article takes a discourse theoretical approach to examine the ideologies presented in these 
media, and reflects on the ways in which these game artefacts engage with, and reject, Western 
narratives of history and of US pre-eminence. It concludes that, while these game interventions 
challenge existing hegemonic (re)presentations of the Middle East and the ‘War on Terror’, they 
remove or reduce agency to the extent that those who engage with them can only witness these 
challenges, rather than instigate their own. We view this lack of agency as support for Mouffe’s 
(2005) proposition that more often than not the result of counter-hegemonic resistance is to 
maintain and reproduce the hegemonic order, though we acknowledge that this is not inevitable, 
as hegemony can always be challenged (Mouffe, in Carpentier and Cammaerts, 2006).   
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Introduction 
In recent years, non-state actors in the Middle East have engaged a new generation of activists 
through a variety of media strategies. Notable amongst these have been a series of videogame 
interventions, which have appropriated Western game products to convey political and religious 
messages through the inversion or complication of the roles of hero and enemy. These ‘resistant’ 
videogames and associated media offer a space to think through the nature of hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic representations of the activities of groups which, in the West at least, are 
typically identified as terrorist or insurgent, and fall within the purview of the ongoing ‘War on 
Terror’, a contemporary conflict but one with a fifteen year history.  
 
In this article, we explore a selection of videogame interventions produced in support of two of 
the more prominent ‘terrorist’ groups, Hezbollah and Islamic State (IS). These include, on the 
part of Hezbollah, the Al Quwwa el-Khassa (‘Special Force’, SF) video games, produced by the 
Central Internet Bureau of Hezbollah in 2002, after the withdrawal of the Israeli army from 
South Lebanon (SF 1), and in 2007, in the aftermaths of the July 2006 war between Israel and the 
Hezbollah (SF 2). On the part of IS, we look at the video mashup Salil el-Sawarem (‘Clash of 
Blades’), produced using Grand Theft Auto V (GTA), and at a machinima series produced using a 
modified version of ArmA 3.
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 These game artefacts work across the range of ‘forms of 
indigenous militarisation’ in protest games identified by Nick Robinson – existing game spaces 
used as sites of political protest (GTA), modifications to existing games to create spaces for 
social protest (ArmA 3), and games specifically designed to challenge the dominant social order 
(SF 1 and 2) (Robinson, 2012: 505, 513).  
 
We take a discourse theoretical approach to examining the ideologies at play in these media, and 
consider how the intersection of videogames and modern information and communication 
technologies affords not only the production and circulation of ‘dissident’ content, but also the 
effective conveyance of meaningful political messages. Our analysis is contextualised in the 
representation of political Islam in mainstream media, and reflects on the ways in which these 
game artefacts engage with, and reject, Western narratives of history and of US pre-eminence. 
Our discussions and conclusions contribute to debates around the politics of militarised 
entertainment, around the relationships of media and resistance, and around the historical 
potential of videogames.  
 
 
The Middle East as ‘the favourite ground’ of the US perpetual ‘War on 
Terror’ 
A possible point of departure for our exploration of Hezbollah and IS videogames is the deep-
rooted relationship between games and militarism. There is broad consensus in the literature of 
the last two decades on the longstanding connection between videogames, specifically those 
produced in the United States, and what has been labelled the ‘military-entertainment complex’ 
(Huntmann and Payne 2010; Bogost 2007 and 2008; Der Derian 2009; Robinson 2012; Šisler 
2008, among others). Often referred to as a post-Cold war phenomenon, the ‘military-
entertainment complex’ attests to the blurred frontiers between entertainment as a media genre, 
and the ever-expanding military power of the United States (Huntemann and Payne, 2010: 6). In 
the same way, scholars see this blurring as the natural result of the ‘development in military 
ethos towards a net-centric warfare’ where computer technology and military supremacy on 
battlefield have become increasingly intertwined (Der Derian, 2009: 241-242). 
 
Nonetheless, these connections between videogames and contemporary conflicts – most notably 
the post-9/11 US ‘War on Terror’ – have pushed scholars from across the Arts, Humanities and 
Social Sciences to call for more serious studies of videogames (Robinson, 2012). They also 
highlight the need to mobilise a cross-disciplinary methodological matrix from Media and 
Cultural Studies, Post-Colonial Studies, Sociology, History and Political Science to explore the 
complex relationships between the game space that military games produce, the narratives they 
construct and the militarisation of politics and society more broadly. Through using the discourse 
theoretical approach as a methodological framework for the analysis of Hezbollah and IS 
videogame productions, this article responds to the call to incorporate theoretical tools associated 
with Cultural Studies in the analysis of games (Höglund, 2008). 
 
Unsurprisingly, the Middle East has been, since the end of the cold war, the focus and epicentre 
of this US ‘military-entertainment complex’, to an extent that it has been referred to as the 
‘favourite virtual battleground’ of the perpetual US battles against terrorism (Šisler, 2008: 208). 
As such, as Šisler’s study demonstrates, most military games produced in the United States since 
the 1990s, and in the aftermath of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, take place in an imagined 
Middle East. These games have, for the most part, inherited the West’s mainstream orientalising 
systems of political identification (Said, 1978 and 1997); the representations of Arab and Muslim 
inhabitants of this virtual Middle East are generally based on a series of dichotomies between a 
civilised, modern, democratic and peace-loving (Western) self, and an uncivilised, archaic, 
totalitarian and violent (Arab) other (Hafez, 2000; Shaheen, 2000; Karim, 2006; Šisler, 2008).   
 
These overgeneralising depictions of Arabs in US games have been addressed – and largely 
criticised – by a number of scholars, many of whom are referenced at the end of this article. Two 
main contributions from this vast body of literature are particularly useful for the argument we 
are attempting to make in this piece: on the one hand, the concept of ‘neo-Orientalism’; and on 
the other, the depiction of the Middle-East as the site of a ‘permanent state of war’,2 both 
presented in Höglund’s (2008) article ‘Electronic Empire: Orientalism revisited in the military 
shooter’. Building on Edward Said’s Orientalism, Höglund introduces the concept of neo-
Orientalism, which he defines as a discourse within military electronic entertainment 
‘characterized by the construction of the Middle East as a frontier zone where a perpetual war 
between US interests and Islamic terrorism is enacted’ (2008). This creates a framework within 
which the Middle East remains a space where the US can endlessly fight its (necessary) ‘War on 
Terror’. It is in the interest of the United States that this war never ends, in the same way, 
Höglund writes, that in Orwell’s 1984, it is in the interest of governments that certain wars never 
stop, because ‘not only does a perpetual war fuel a nation's (war) industry indefinitely, [but] it 
also allows the beleaguered nation to believe that the hostile (but never finally defined) Other is 
being perpetually contained’ (2008: n.p.).  
 
But who is/are the Other(s) that the US is fighting in its (real) ‘War on Terror’, and through its 
war games, often presented to us as (realistic)
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 depictions of this war? Indeed, has much changed 
in the ways political Islam is depicted in today’s mainstream narratives, nearly four decades after 
the publication of Edward Said’s influential book Orientalism? We propose, as a possible 
response to this question, that we imagine Otherness as a single elastic frame; while there may be 
several ways one could be an other, all disparate expressions of Otherness need to fit into this 
one, single frame. The elastic borders of the frame would stretch to include new others, more 
others – as the United States and its Western allies wage new wars, more wars. The frame adapts 
itself to new military realities, but does not really change. In other words, the same Otherness 
which ‘contained’ Hezbollah videogames and their visual media productions in the early 2000s 
has now stretched to include a new other: Islamic State and its new media narratives. Both are 
part of the same frame of Otherness, even though they fight on opposing sides in the Syrian war. 
In that sense, we can say that little has changed, as the Western hegemonic gaze still persists in 
compressing all expressions of political Islam into a single ‘terrorist’ frame; as GW Bush 
famously remarked in his address to the US Congress on September 20, 2001: ‘either you are 
with us or you are with the terrorists’. Here, then, we must attempt to move beyond such binary 
depictions of war. 
 
 
Making games that make statements: ideology, hegemony, history and 
the ‘persuasive power’ of games  
Before we move on, however, some definitions are in order. Following Šisler’s definition of 
representation as ‘the construction of meaning through symbols and images’ (2008: 203), we 
embrace Galloway’s (2004) suggestion that traditional debates on representation should include 
visual productions and videogames. We also acknowledge Bogost’s (2007) argument for the 
unique ‘persuasive powers’ of some (political) videogames: ‘they open a new domain for 
persuasion through rule-based representations and interactions, different than the spoken word, 
writing, images and moving pictures’ (2007: ix).  
 
Following Louis Althusser’s Ideological State Apparatuses (Althusser, 2001: 96), we approach 
ideology as the set of ideals, values, doctrines, principles and symbols that defines a social order. 
In that sense, we emphasize the role ideology plays in the construction of the image of the ‘self’ 
and the ‘other’, especially in contexts of societal and political struggles for representation. We 
also acknowledge, within the framework of Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) discourse theory, the 
Gramscian origins of the notion of hegemony, and define it as the concept that underpins and 
reflects mechanisms of discursive struggles. In this context, Carpentier suggests a useful 
approach to understanding the role of hegemony in situations of conflict: ‘In the event of war the 
articulation of hegemony becomes relevant as the warring parties not only try to physically 
destroy the enemy, but also attempt to hegemonize their “own” discourses on the enemy and on 
the self’ (2008: 30-31).  
 
By extending these definitions to videogames, we argue that war games operate with similar 
ideological mappings; on the one hand, they are vehicles that convey and disseminate the 
dominant ideologies of the hegemonising powers, and by doing so reinforce pre-conceived 
cultural stereotypes upon the self and upon the other. On the other hand, the rise of new 
information and communication technologies and the democratisation of image production and 
distribution has made it possible for counter-hegemonic forces to produce their own games and 
narratives of dissent, thus challenging the perspectives of the ‘military-entertainment complex’ 
by offering alternatives to the Western-led militarisation of society. Chantal Mouffe explains that 
every hegemonic order is susceptible to be challenged by counter-hegemonic practices, ‘i.e. 
practices which will attempt to disarticulate the existing order so as to install other forms of 
hegemony’ (2005: 18). We will return to the notion of new forms of hegemony later, but for the 
time being, it is precisely in these negotiated spaces between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
struggles for representation that our analysis of Hezbollah and IS videogame productions finds 
its main anchoring points.   
 
In their analysis of the representation of otherness in US First-Person Shooter (FPS) games, 
Intizidis and Prevedourakis explain that videogames combine multiple modes of representation – 
audiovisual, textual, and digital genres and discourses – ‘through which both the self and the 
other are constantly imagined, constructed, and articulated’ (2008: 209). These discourses are 
essentially political ‘because they ascribe meaning to the gamer’s actions and to the overall 
causal environment’ (2008: 216). They also accompany the formation of national identities; a 
collective ‘we’ opposed to a distinct ‘them’ (2008: 210). Building on Fairclough’s (1997) 
approach to discourse as a medium for the social construction of meaning, we suggest 
approaching videogames as discourses,
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 with discourses being structures in which meaning is 
constantly negotiated and constructed (Laclau, 1988: 254).  Within these structures, it becomes 
possible for videogames ‘to make arguments, to persuade and to express ideas’ (Bogost, 2008: 
137). Produced within contexts where there are constant struggles over societal and political 
meanings, games can then contribute to these struggles in two ways; ‘through the messages they 
contain, and through their dynamics of play’ (Robinson, 2012: 507). In this context, Robinson 
sees in Bogost’s ‘procedural rhetoric’ – ‘a technique for making arguments with computational 
systems and for unpacking computational arguments others have created’ (Bogost, 2007:3) – a 
useful entry point to describe ways in which videogames have the potential to challenge 
dominant hegemonies and ideologies. 
 
 
As we will demonstrate in more detail below, one specific site of ideological conflict in which 
we can see these game materials offer an antagonistic discourse is the space of history. In the 
case of the Special Force games, for example, there is a deliberate and explicit reimagining of a 
series of past events. In the far more recent ArmA 3 machinima, the events referenced are both 
contemporary and historic – the present conflict in Iraq and Syria evoked by the ‘IS brand’, and 
the conceptions of the Middle East as a site of endless war discussed above. Thus earlier 
interventions like Special Force 2 (concerned with the 2006 July War in Lebanon) reject or 
complicate narratives of what is seen by Westerners as a historic war, now ended; more recent 
productions, predominantly supporting IS, reject or complicate the growing history of the War 
on Terror by addressing conflicts which are still taking place. These perspectives thus present a 
case for a particular kind of historicisation of this warfare within the framing of the ‘endless war 
in the Middle East’, rejecting this idea in favour of an ‘endless war with the West’. 
  
These rejections and complications are laid out in a variety of forms across the materials we 
examine. We accept here Keith Jenkins’ (2003: 31-2) proposition that history is a discourse 
about the past created by ‘present-minded workers’ and, as a consequence, we accept the 
arguments of a number of writers who indicate that the experience of the past presented by and 
through videogames is a legitimate form of history (see, for example, Kapell and Elliott, 2013). 
Important is the sense of tension which exists in games which engage with the past, between 
‘simulation’ and ‘representation’ (Peterson, Miller and Fedorko, 2013: 35-6), specified by 
Gonzalo Frasca (2003) as between the simulation mode of games, and the representational 
narrative mode of traditional media. The implications of this distinction hold even greater 
significance when considered in terms of history, something especially true in light of the 
contributions of writers such as Hayden White (1990), who have explored in detail the 
relationship between narrative and historical representation, and, indeed, historical truth. Given 
that many (Western) expectations of historical work remain grounded in notions of objectivity, 
causation and codification running back to the Greek historian Thucydides, the ‘rigorous 
standards’ of true historical representation are rarely met by video games (Peterson, Miller and 
Fedorko, 2013: 35-6). Consequently, it is more accurate to consider the majority of historical 
games as simulations: they do engage with the past, but ‘at almost no point do these games 
feature a factually correct past’, with accuracy often sacrificed in favour of, for example, a good 
gameplay experience (Kapell and Elliott, 2013: 358). 
 
Antagonistic discourses on the enemy and the self through Hezbollah 
and IS videogame productions 
With these principles established, we move on to investigate the potential of these videogame 
interventions to offer antagonistic discourses. While a considerable body of literature has 
addressed the ways in which these games challenge the Western-led militarisation of society 
through methods drawn from semiotics and textual analysis (see Šisler, 2008; 2009; Roumani, 
2006; Robinson, 2012; Höglund, 2008), we suggest looking at these productions from a different 
angle. We will first analyse depictions of the self within Hezbollah and IS productions, and then 
focus on the many differences between the two groups’ ‘dissident’ narratives. This will allow us 
to counter the Western generalising gaze, which, as we mentioned earlier in the article, insists on 
compressing different expressions of political Islam into a single ‘terrorist’ frame.  
 
Hezbollah was established in 1982 as a response to Israel’s invasion of Beirut, and within only a 
few years was recognized as a ‘legitimate resistance movement’ against the Israeli occupation of 
Southern Lebanon (Palmer Harik, 2005). By participating in the 1992 elections, Hezbollah 
established itself as a political party, extending its popular base beyond the Shiite communities to 
win support and recognition both nationally and regionally. Despite the countless controversies it 
has since sparked around its legitimacy and politics, Hezbollah has undoubtedly set a precedent 
in Lebanon and the Arab region in terms of its various media productions, including its music 
videos, filmed military operations (Houri and Saber, 2010), and videogames.  
 
These politics are forcefully conveyed in these media forms. Special Force 2, for example, opens 
with ‘verbal rhetoric’ (Bogost, 2007: 104), an Arabic text5 which contextualises the action, 
casting Israel as the ‘enemy’ whom the gamer is invited to ‘resist’. So here we see the subversion 
of a familiar game environment to create a new narrative where there is only space for a new, 
glorified ‘self’.  
 Figure 1: Special Force 2 opening screen  
(Author-captured screenshot of gameplay) 
 
 
Videogames are based on a series of discursive framings, ‘as they (visually, textually and 
sonically) construct meanings, through narratives that combine filmic, literary, and textual modes 
of representation’ (Intizidis and Prevedourakis, 2008: 210). Central to these mediated narratives 
in US war games, and more particularly in First-Person Shooter (FPS) games, is the American 
GI. Typically, he is presented ‘as a noble hero, embracing the ideals of loyalty, honour, sacrifice 
and above all patriotism’ (Penney, 2010: 190). This American ‘hero’ often has allies; from 
different places, with different origins, and with different skills on the virtual battlefield. The 
enemy, on the other hand, is ‘vague, homogenous, massive and rigid’ (Intizidis and 
Prevedourakis, 2008: 215). More often than not in recent games, the enemy is an Arab, from the 
Middle East; he is the ‘villain’ that the GI is meant to fight against. Bogost (2007) explains that 
one of the most curious ‘procedural rhetorics’ of US war games like America’s Army is that, 
despite this being a multiplayer game, everyone always takes on the role of US Army soldiers. 
‘No one ever plays a villain fighting the US, both teams play the same mission with one 
assaulting and the other defending, but [they] both believe themselves to be the “good guys”’ 
(Bogost, 2007: 75). Thus, by substituting the American GI with a thick-bearded man who looks 
and speaks Arabic (SF), and by extending the range of fighters’ roles that players can perform to 
include Iraqi and Kurdish army men, and camouflaged IS fighters (ArmA 3 mod), these 
videogame productions create new sites of protest, wherein gamers can identify with a different 
point of view from that of the American GI. This, one could argue, is a characteristic which 
Hezbollah and IS videogame productions share. 
 Figure 2: An Iraqi army outpost and a Kurdish fighter from the Peshmerga army (ArmA 3 mod) 
(Author-captured screenshot of gameplay) 
 
Figure 3: IS fighters (ArmA 3 mod) 
(Author-captured screenshot of gameplay) 
 
In these new ‘possibility spaces’ (Bogost, 2008: 137),6 the classic good-versus-evil matrix is 
preserved, only the roles have now been switched; the Middle Eastern other has become the 
heroic self, and the Western self the other. Indeed, the now-othered American self is almost 
absent from the dissident histories these videogames produce. Both the game space and the 
narratives it constructs are entirely dedicated to the celebration of the now-victorious Middle-
Eastern self. Yet the possibilities for their players or audiences remain limited. While the Special 
Force narratives may differ in perspective and outcome from those in a typical Western game of 
this kind, they are fixed narratives and the player is not afforded any form of narrative 
exploration; to successfully complete the game is to experience the narrative exactly as intended 
by its authors. The IS interventions are yet more restrictive; they are not games in themselves, 
and their possibilities are thus vested in an implied game, used to create media to be explored by 
passive viewers rather than active players. 
 
On the distinctions between Hezbollah and IS videogame interventions 
In his description of the virtual Middle East as depicted in games funded by the military-
entertainment complex, Höglund (2008) explains that US war games render an ‘ideological 
space that really has very little to do with the reality in the Middle East, but which makes perfect 
sense within the wider discursive formation of the War on Terror launched by Bush after 9/11’. 
While in the ‘real’ Middle East, IS and Hezbollah fight on opposing sides of the Syrian war, 
‘realistic’ Western mainstream narrations insist on depicting IS and the Hezbollah as two aspects 
of one ‘utterly evil enemy’ (Laclau, 1977) – of one ‘terrorist’ other. We identify below three 
differences between Hezbollah and IS videogame productions; for the sake of brevity, we limit 
our analysis to design, authorship and audience.    
 
Design 
While IS media productions have completely adopted Western aesthetics of visual 
communication, and have incorporated all the affordances of new information and 
communication technologies, Special Force and other Hezbollah media productions have 
preserved a guerrilla-like aesthetic. One metaphor that would work well to describe Hezbollah 
media productions from the early 1990s to the present day is that of the AK-47 rifle. While the 
party was a true pioneer in Lebanon and the broader Arab region in the use of media and video 
innovations, it has always resorted to accessible and easily handled technologies that are 
metaphorically ‘the Kalashnikov of image production’ (Houri and Saber, 2010: 73-74). In other 
words, the cheaper and poorer-quality video camera always seemed adequate for Hezbollah’s 
military actions and media representations, much as the simple, lightweight and inexpensive 
Kalashnikov has long been associated with guerrilla warfare around the world.  
 
In that sense, while IS videogame productions deploy the English language (e.g. Salil el-
Sawarem’s opening screen reads ‘Your games which are producing from you, we do the same 
actions in the battlefields’) and have fully adopted Western strategies of visual representation, 
Special Force’s design remained basic. The image quality is poor and grainy, and the game itself 
full of bugs, attesting to the party’s preference for small-scale media productions and alternative 
means of broadcasting as a way to subvert and defy the imbalance that characterizes the global 
media landscape (Houri and Saber, 2010: 74). Significantly, however, it is Hezbollah who have 
created their own video games, and not IS. Special Force 1 and 2 are complete, playable games; 
IS employ Western video games and their aesthetics to produce visual media, but not playable 
media. There is not even clear evidence that the modification to ArmA 3, used as the basis of the 
machinima series to which we refer, was produced by IS, only that it was used by them. 
 
 
Authorship 
While, as described in the introduction, the Special Force games were produced by the Central 
Internet Bureau of Hezbollah, IS videogame productions have unknown authors and are, for the 
most part, the result of the ‘good will’ and personal initiatives taken by individuals around the 
world; some are IS supporters, and some are not. This reflects the globalised nature of IS, as 
opposed to the local and small-scale nature of the Lebanese Hezbollah. While ‘headquartered’ in 
Raqqa, IS aims to expand its control beyond Syria, Iraq and the Arab region, and as a result its 
media productions use a completely different language from Hezbollah to address a wider, global 
audience. This brings us to our third and probably most significant point.  
 
Audience 
According to the Central Internet Bureau, Special Force was developed to counter US-made 
games which ‘enfold humiliation to many of [the] Islamic and Arab countries, where battles are 
running in Arab countries, [where] the dead are Arab soldiers, whereas the hero who kills them is 
– the player himself – an American’ (cited in Šisler, 2008: 211). Therefore, the audience for 
games such as Special Force is mainly ‘Arab gamers’, as the head of the Syrian game company 
Afkar Media puts it (cited in Roumani, 2006). Consequently, we would disagree with Robinson’s 
view that such games have not ‘realised their persuasive potential’ if their address to Western 
audiences has been limited (2012: 519); we would instead contend that these games were never 
intended to engage a Western audience. Unlike IS videogame productions which are designed for 
promotion and for recruitment purposes, and target both Arab and Western audiences, Hezbollah 
videogames were developed for a local, Arab and Arabic-speaking audience, making them 
substantially different from the IS productions we discuss.   
 
As noted above, all of these videogame productions make – directly or indirectly – a bold claim: 
to (re)write history. In order, therefore, to situate our analysis of these artefacts within wider 
discussions on the legitimacy on the US ‘War on Terror’, we now turn to history as a specific 
site of negotiation of hegemonic and ‘resistant’ ideological narratives.  
 
Alternative or counterfactual history 
The media under analysis in this article address history in three principal ways. In the first case, 
this is through a storytelling form which resists established histories through a counterfactual 
representational narrative, in which known events are reordered or reimagined, and dialogue and 
other media resources selectively deployed to provide support for the story. This is, for example, 
the approach of Special Force 2, in which the events of the July War conclude with Hezbollah’s 
victory, a presentation supported throughout with carefully selected contemporary media 
material. Of the three approaches, this is the most direct and explicit address to existing 
hegemonic history; in clearly framing an ideological view of the past and, consequently, an 
imagined ‘better present’, it is also the most explicit rejection of that hegemony. 
 
In contrast, the second mode of address engages in a relationship with Western hegemonic 
discourse which is more in the nature of rhetoric rather than challenge. Here, Western notions of 
history are called upon to frame non-hegemonic interpretations, through an analogy which 
subjects its audience to an unpleasant shift in perspective, as the positions of Western hero and 
Middle Eastern enemy are reversed. This mode is demonstrated through a poster circulated 
online, entitled ‘This is our Call of Duty’. (Although it would be impossible, as discussed above, 
to confidently establish authorship of this poster, the IS flag is clearly identifiable in the top right 
corner of the image, with the words Rayat al-Tawheed, the ‘Banner’ or ‘Black Flag’ of Tawheed, 
a sign of unity in the Muslim ‘Ummah’ claimed by IS in their communications). 
 Figure 4: IS Call of Duty poster published online 
(Author-captured screenshot of poster) 
 
‘This’, we understand, is the ‘War on Terror’. The Call of Duty franchise frames itself firmly in 
terms of major threats to the West/the US: the original games focused on World War 2, with 
subsequent releases addressing the Cold War and war in the Middle East. Here, however, ‘jihad’ 
and ‘martyrdom’ have replaced the original American black-ops and ‘heroes’. As part of a 
selection of products responding to what some commentators have dubbed BrandWW2 
(Bullinger and Salvati, 2011), the game presents the player as a heroic figure ‘within a grand 
historical and nationalist narrative’ (Gish, 2010: 169) in what one commentator has called ‘a 
clear cut “good vs. evil” scenario’ (Salvati and Bullinger, 2013: 154). The rhetorical action of the 
IS poster reverses this position, contesting this presentation and thus the ‘goodness’ of the ‘War 
on Terror’.  
 
The final form of historical address is expressed through the sense of engagement offered by the 
media experience itself, either through playing games such as Special Force, playing or watching 
the ArmA 3 mod, or watching the video production based on GTA V. Games like these, in the 
FPS genre, do much of their communicative work through situation: as we understand from Call 
of Duty, for example, games like Special Force render the player as a ‘historically situated agent’ 
(Kapell and Elliott, 2013: 10), present in a ‘historically charged space’ (Reisner, 2013: 248). The 
player is surrounded by historical context, which goes beyond the level of narrative to provide a 
consistent and implicit sense of a past. This ‘recognisable’ history is the visual rhetoric which 
also gives force to the video and machinima; the desert context and dress of the participants in 
the GTA video, for example, moves us beyond the imaginary California of the original game and 
into the heart of the ‘War on Terror’, through a discourse imprinted upon our minds throughout 
the war’s history. 
 Figure 5: IS adaptation of GTA V in Salil el-Sawarem’s trailer 
(Author-captured screenshot of trailer) 
 
In their presentations and engagements with the past, then, we argue that neither the Hezbollah 
nor the IS game artefacts will represent an ‘objective’ truth. They do not set out to be historical 
in the traditional historian’s sense; rather, they attempt to provide a form of what we might call 
referential experience: history brought to mind in a number of different ways, more or less 
directly depending on the artefact under analysis. And in any case, as we have already indicated, 
these games offer ‘resistant perspectives’ on the past. 
 
There is a growing body of work on the importance of alternative or ‘counterfactual’ histories in 
games, and their reflection of the poststructuralist turn in historical work more broadly (e.g. 
Uricchio, 2005; Gish, 2010; Apperley, 2013). While the exploration of what ‘might-have-been’ 
fell on the wrong side of EH Carr’s division between a historical school of thought and an 
unhistorical school of emotion (Carr, 1964: 96-8), scholars such as Tom Apperley (2013) reject 
this view, seeing counterfactual history as a legitimate form of historical speculation which 
offers ways of critically engaging with history, and challenges the authority of hegemonic and 
linear histories, promoting a sense of a past which is plural and contingent. In principal, in 
offering the space for producing such alternatives, historical games ‘subvert the project of 
consolidation and certainty associated with the former brand of history’ (Uricchio, 2005: 333). 
 
This in turn prompts a reflection on the idea of authenticity. Some recent work has attempted to 
create distance between the traditional historical use of the term, as synonymous with the 
accurate, and its employment in terms of historical games (and, indeed, other media 
presentations of history). Salvati and Bullinger have proposed the term ‘selective authenticity’ to 
describe the ‘narrative license, in which an interactive experience of the past blends historical 
representation with generic conventions and audience expectations, all within a reductive frame’; 
in their case that of World War 2 (Salvati and Bullinger, 2013: 154). Kapell and Elliott favour 
deploying authenticity to refer not to an accurate description of a given period, but instead to 
‘what audiences think the period looked like’ (Kapell and Elliott, 2013: 361). Yet an experiential 
reading of authenticity can provide a further perspective, employing the term on a more broadly 
cultural rather than historical basis; a sense of ‘being-thereness’, of bearing witness (Reisner, 
2013: 250) or, as one of us has argued elsewhere, a sense of realness deriving from that presence, 
from that witnessing (Carter et al., 2015). Returning to the ideas about visual design that we lay 
out above, it appears that both Hezbollah and IS thus employ a dual sense of the authentic, 
meeting their audiences’ expectations both in terms of production style and the experiential 
frame of their content.  
 
In deploying these game media to advance discourses of alternate history, however, both IS and 
Hezbollah prompt further historically-founded questions. Apperley’s view above is a reasonable 
one if we accept that the purpose of games, if not to represent historical truth, is to foster an 
engagement with history which is in some way educational (the idea of scholarly or didactic 
purpose is strongly represented in the literature around historical games, e.g. McCall, 2012; 
Clyde, Hopkins and Wilkinson, 2012; Spring, 2015). Yet as we have demonstrated, the principal 
use value of these materials is not educational but ideological; and as Arlette Farge suggests, ‘it 
is one thing to understand history as a process of permanent reinterpretation of the past from the 
standpoint of contemporary society and its needs. It is quite another to press events from the past 
into the service of ideology’ (Farge 1989/2013: 97-8). 
 
   
Conclusion: ideological games that make historical claims 
Quoting a former US army Chief of Staff, Nieborg (2010) explains that the US does not see the 
global ‘War on Terror’ as a war against ‘stateless criminals’, but as a ‘war of ideas’: ‘This is not 
simply a fight against terror - terror is a tactic. This is not simply a fight against Al Qaeda, and 
adherents - they are foot soldiers. This is not simply a fight to bring democracy to the Middle 
East - that is a strategic objective. This is a fight for the very ideas at the foundation of our 
society, the ways of life those ideas enable, and the freedoms we enjoy’ (Nieborg, 2010: 57). 
 
But in fact, the United States is not alone in this fight for ideas. As we have attempted to show in 
this article, a number of groups from across the Middle East are challenging Western monopolies 
over political representation by modifying existing US war games and producing their own. 
These videogame interventions, made possible by the democratisation of image production and 
dissemination during the last few decades, are creating new spaces within which hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic narratives are being re-negotiated. In other words, common-sense 
assumptions on how the world works, on what is good and evil, right and wrong, are no longer 
unitarily defined by the powerful Western self (Penney, 2010: 190). ‘Dissident’ narratives have 
carved their way through mainstream spheres of political identification, through videogames and 
a range of other visual media productions.  
 
However, in tying this potential for challenging hegemony back to the discourse theoretical 
approach, we wonder if these interventions simply reproduce the very hegemonic frames they 
intended to counter (Mouffe, 2005). A significant point in this context is the lack of agency these 
media products present. While games do have the potential to question determinist and 
hegemonic interpretations of the past, they cannot do so when the player has no true agency. In 
fact, several scholars highlight the limitations of ‘possibility spaces’ within game design; while it 
may seem that narration in videogames is a free and open process, dependent upon the gamer’s 
skills and decisions, this freedom is an illusion. As demonstrated in the Special Force games, in 
most FPSes, player agency (and thus history) is limited to shooting or not shooting (Reisner, 
2013: 252), or perhaps hitting or not hitting, giving some truth to the critique that historical 
games merely present ‘the trappings of history’ as a gameplay enhancement or ‘masculine 
backdrop’, rather than a form of engagement (Peterson, Miller and Fedorko, 2013: 43; De Groot, 
2009: 138). In that sense, players are constantly required to follow a pre-established set of rules, 
within a prearranged level, with predefined objectives or aims (Intizidis and Prevedourakis, 
2008: 212). 
 
Even in the Special Force games, therefore, the player is a witness rather than a participant; there 
is only one possible version of game play (and one possible version of history): that of the 
‘resistance’ winning over the ‘Zionist enemy’. In the IS videos, machinima and advertisements, 
agency is reduced even further. As such, we embrace Mouffe’s (2005) proposition that in its 
struggle against hegemony, ‘resistance’ often reproduces similar hegemonic frames, thus 
contributing to the maintenance and reproduction of the hegemonic order. While these games 
attempt to produce counter-hegemonic perspectives, the history presented cannot be challenged; 
by limiting agency, players are no longer actors but acted upon, thus undermining the games’ 
simulation value and pushing them back towards inaccurate, ideological representations of the 
past. 
 
Notes 
1 Special Force was released in 2002, shortly after the withdrawal of the Israeli army from 
Southern Lebanon. Special Force 2, produced using an unlicensed copy of Crytek’s CryEngine, 
followed in 2007, only a few months after the July 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel. We 
should note that the exact provenance of the video and machinima materials is uncertain, and our 
attributions are based on the messages conveyed within them. Their support for each 
organisation is, however, explicit. The ArmA mod itself does not appear to have been made in 
direct support of IS, although in affording access to playable IS avatars, it creates a context for 
the production of resistant narratives. Mods of this kind, involving replacement of game graphics 
and audio files to change the appearance and sounds of in-game characters, are commonly made 
by players wishing to use such games to represent specific conflicts, or the armed forces of 
particular nations.  
2 Note also that Nick Robinson draws on Paul Virilio’s concept of ‘pure war’ to suggest that 
‘society is progressively developing into a permanent war economy, where it is increasingly 
difficult to maintain a clear distinction between periods of war and peace’ (Robinson, 202, p. 
509). 
3 In this context, scholars make an interesting (and quite useful) distinction between the ‘real’ 
and the ‘realistic’ Middle East as depicted in US war games, and between ‘realistic’ and ‘realist’ 
war games more generally: ‘for a game producer to suggest that a particular game is realistic is 
not necessarily problematic. It merely means that the game appears lifelike. To propose that the 
game is real is problematic as this means that what happens in the game may also happen, or has 
happened, in reality and that the ideological and political rationale of the game is similar to the 
world we inhabit with our physical bodies’ (Höglund, 2008). 
4 Torfing (1999, cited in Carpentier, 2008: 17) distinguishes three domains where discourse 
theory can be put at work:  a) the study of discourses about the media and their place and 
function in society; b) the study of discourses of the mass media (i.e. of the form and content of 
the discourses produced by the media; c) the study of media as discourse. When applied to the 
study of Hezbollah and IS videogame productions, this distinction could potentially be very 
useful: a) the study of mainstream media discourses about the videogames (the alarming 
narrative most Western media used to cover Hezbollah and IS videogames, considering them as 
dangerous propaganda and recruitment tools, b) the study of the discourses of the videogames 
(i.e. the game space they create and the narrative they construct), and c) the study of the 
videogames as discourses (which is basically what this paper attempts to achieve). 
5 Translation by the authors - Tale of the Truthful Pledge: ‘The July way… The confrontation 
that rewrote history … the battle that drew the beginning of the end of the Zionist entity, and that 
drew an end to the era of [Arab] defeats, to launch a new era of permanent victories. A realistic 
reconstitution of the resistance during the July war, which destroyed the myth of “the 
undefeatable army”, and which caused tears to the soldiers who were only used to win. A game 
developed with the latest 3D technologies, which puts the gamers in the heart of the battle, 
making him part of the victory by supporting the resistants, and by experiencing what they felt 
when they destroyed the arsenal of the Zionist enemy and eliminated the aggressors’. 
6 In his analysis of the ‘persuasive power’ of videogames, Bogost (2007) talks about the new 
spaces for the exploration of rules that games create through processes of experimentation, which 
he refers to as the ‘possibility spaces’. According to Robinson (2012) it is within these spaces of 
possibility that game modifications (mods) operate. It is also through these spaces that ‘games 
attain their persuasive power and become instrumental to social critique and reflective learning’ 
(Robinson, 2012: 506). But Robinson explains that the potential for successful social protest 
remains restricted because mods and their ‘possibility spaces’ are bound to operate within the 
restrictions of the game’s original processes and designs. 
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